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I INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder primacy theory is outdated as it fails to acknowledge the business case 
for adopting socially responsible practices. Given that social factors now play a 
major role in the quest for profit maximisation, the hypothesis that social engage-
ment should be considered ultra vires from business activities is contradictory. Part 
one of this paper outlines the theoretical debate between Berle and Dodd regarding 
the proper purpose of the corporation and the role of social factors in decision 
making. Discussion focuses on what should be the primary motivation for a corpo-
ration, and leads to an outline of the legal position in Australia with respect to 
directors’ duties and statutory obligations. Part two of the paper considers the 
development of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement in the commu-
nity and the factors which have shaped stakeholder expectations. Consideration is 
given to the impact of the culture of ruthless profit maximisation in the 1980s, the 
development of “insincere” CSR and recent governance crises such as corporate 
collapses and substantial increases in directors’ remuneration.  
Part three of the paper argues that a misunderstanding of CSR concepts by com-
mentators has led to confusion as to what amounts to social responsibility. An 
accurate definition of CSR is presented based on risk management principles asso-
ciated with governance, environment, social and workplace issues. In line with this 
definition, examples such as occupational health and safety and corporate philan-
thropy are evidence of socially responsible strategies which afford financial benefit 
or increased goodwill for a corporation. Part four of the paper reviews proposed 
amendments to corporations law in Australia and outlines the preferred approach to 
CSR management. Discussion also focuses on the impact of the business judgement 
rule and ultimately concludes that the interconnectedness of social and financial 
performance is challenging the legitimacy of shareholder primacy theory.  
II THE THEORETICAL DEBATE 
Debate regarding the role of the corporation has historically taken place between 
shareholder primacy and social welfare theorists. The views of each school are best 
conveyed by Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd, whose public debate in the post-
Depression era spawned widespread controversy regarding the potential regulation 
of industry. The theory of shareholder primacy, endorsed by Berle, contends that a 
corporation is primarily responsible to its shareholders to maximise profits; as a 
result social factors which sacrifice shareholder wealth should not be taken into 
account.1 Berle contends that the managers of an entity owe a fiduciary responsibil-
ity to its shareholders based on an application of the law of trusts. He proposes that 
an equitable limitation exists on the exercise of all corporate powers and that such 
powers “…are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of 
all the shareholders as their interest appears.”2  
1 Adolph Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, HARV. L. REV. Vol. 44, 1049 (1931). 
2 Id., at 1049. 
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Under this model the sole purpose of the enterprise must be to maximise share-
holder wealth and avoid succumbing to social influences which serve to sacrifice 
profit. Silverstein notes that this philosophy evolves from Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hands” doctrine which argues that individuals, and by implication businesses, 
cannot be “do-gooders” as they lack the knowledge required to make social deci-
sions. Instead corporations will benefit society by creating wealth for individuals, 
which will in turn lead to a more dynamic community. Silverstein notes, “Individu-
als should simply seek to maximise profits, profit seeking frees us from having to 
make controversial value judgements. The “invisible hand” doctrine assures us that 
profit seeking will invariably lead to the most economically efficient allocation of 
resources which, in turn, will produce the greatest utility for the world taken as a 
whole.”3 Accordingly social welfare is best served through the “invisible hand” of 
the market, as society as a whole will benefit from strong industrial performance.    
Berle’s theory of shareholder primacy has been most famously endorsed by eminent 
free market economist Milton Friedman who suggests that external factors such as 
social responsibilities must be considered ultra vires and illegal if they do not result 
in increased shareholder wealth.4 In defence of Friedman, his article, “The social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits”, has received much scrutiny yet 
was not intended as an academic paper. As Sparkes notes, the article was written in 
1970, amidst a different set of market conditions. He states, the article came “…in 
response to a particular set of circumstances, i.e. the climate of big business in the 
1960s…a time when large companies seemed to be dominated by managerial elites 
with little interest in shareholder returns.”5 Despite this, Friedman has subsequently 
endorsed the position articulated in this article in a recent series of interviews with 
Joel Bakan.6  
Friedman questions how “business”, an inanimate object, can be constrained by 
social responsibilities.7 Corporations, according to Friedman, possess neither the 
authority nor the moral right to divert shareholders’ profits for the welfare of the 
general public. He writes, “Managers are merely agents of the stockholders, and 
thus have no right to spend or give away corporate monies except in the interests of 
increasing shareholder wealth…any stockholder is free to use his dividends to 
support any worthy causes he may choose, but the choice should not be made for 
him by a company president who may not share either his values or priorities.”8 
3 David Silverstein, Managing Corporate Social Responsibility in a Changing Legal Environment, 
AMERICAN B.L.J, Vol. 25, 525 (1987). 
4 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, NY Times, Sept. 1970 
(Magazine) at 33. 
5 Russell Sparkes, A Pragmatic Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, (Address given to The 
School of Management, the London School of Economics, 19 May 2003), available at 
<http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/19-05-03-SPA.pdf> 
6 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER (2004). 
7 Friedman, supra note 4, at 33. 
8 Id., at 33. 
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Instead the responsibility of managers, as agents appointed by shareholders, is to 
maximise shareholder wealth. Friedman notes, “There is one and only one social 
responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits.”9 Henderson also adopts shareholder primacy theory and offers 
contemporary criticism of the commercial application of CSR. Henderson charac-
terises CSR as misguided virtue, stating, “CSR involves the voluntary adoption by 
business of broader objectives, more complex procedures and more exacting stan-
dards. To this extent it would tend to impair enterprise performance, with effects on 
both costs and revenues, short run and long run…the system effects of CSR, as well 
as the enterprise effects, will tend to make people in general worse off.”10 As a 
result, both Friedman and Henderson contend that social temptations inevitably 
erode corporate profits, and must therefore be considered ultra vires of the business 
activities of directors.  
Conversely Dodd argues for the expansion of directors’ fiduciary duties to protect 
the interests of society, not just shareholders. He contends that “Business must 
provide a social service, even at the expense of profits, in order to serve the best 
interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the broader community.”11 While 
Dodd does not question Berle’s application of fiduciary concepts to the exercise of 
corporate powers, he does reject the assertion that corporate entities exist solely for 
the purpose of maximising shareholder wealth. As authority for his view Dodd 
notes, “Public opinion, which ultimately makes law, views the business corporation 
as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit making 
function.”12 In a modern setting, social welfare advocates argue that “big business” 
controls a disproportionate amount of wealth and wields a degree of political power 
today which is unprecedented. Silverstein suggests that, “In the United States we 
recognise the enormous impact of highly paid lobbyists, political action commit-
tees, campaign contributions, and media advertising by large corporations. Fur-
thermore, ownership of these giant corporations is so dispersed that the 
shareholders, in reality, exercise very little control over management.”13 As such, 
corporations owe an obligation to society to act in a socially responsible manner 
even if such actions are not legally mandated. Although strict interpretation of 
Dodd’s theory suggests that a corporation should engage in social welfare even if it 
leads to profit sacrifice, in the modern business setting it appears that social and 
financial performance are interconnected. Therefore in order to truly maximise 
profits a company must engage with social interests.  
9 Id., at 126. 
10David Henderson, Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility, NEW ZEALAND 
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (June 2001). 
11 E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, HARV. L. REV. Vol. 45, 1148, 1150 
(1932). 
12 Id., at 1148. 
13 Silverstein, supra note 3, at 538. 
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III THE LEGAL POSITION   
Corporations law in Australia provides no provisions for social welfare but deter-
minately adopts Berle’s shareholder primacy norm. Corcoran notes that corpora-
tions law is essentially founded on the principles of the Companies Act 1862 (UK). 
She states, “It is a laissez-faire statute which promotes a strict rule of profit maxi-
misation. It actively discourages corporate concern for social welfare when social 
welfare must be purchased at a cost to profit maximisation, even when the social 
welfare is that of its own employees.”14 The primary statutory directors’ duties are 
found in sections 180, 181, 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). These 
duties are: to use due care and diligence,15 act in good faith,16 not make improper 
use of position17 and not make improper use of information.18 In addition to statu-
tory duties, common law imposes the duty to use skill, care and diligence, and the 
duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company as a whole.  
Directors enjoy broad authority to conduct the management of a corporation, yet are 
required to exercise their powers in a manner which the directors honestly believe 
to be in the best interests of the company. Given that the fiduciary duty is owed to 
the company, any actions which foster profitability appear to be in the company’s 
best interests. As a result, the traditional legal position provides that the role of a 
corporation is to maximise profits. In undertaking the obligation to maximise profits 
a director has broad discretion. The subjective nature of the Australian position is 
best outlined by Lord Greene in Re Smith & Fawcett. 19 He states, “Directors must 
exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider – not what a court may 
consider – is in the best interests of the company, and not for any collateral pur-
pose.”20 Only in extreme circumstances, for example where a company has ceased 
to carry on business, or where there is absolutely no conceivable benefit, will it be 
possible to convince the court that directors did not honestly believe their actions 
were in the best interests of the company. Pennycuick J in Charterbridge Corp Ltd 
v Lloyds Bank Ltd 21 provides a degree of objectivity in the test despite the prima 
facie subjective base. His test asks, “…whether an intelligent and honest man in the 
position of a director of the company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing 
circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions were for the benefit of 
the company.”22  
14 Suzanne Corcoran, The Corporation as Citizen and as Government: Social Responsibility and Corpo-
rate Morality, FLINDERS J.L.R, Vol. 2, 53, 54 (1997). 
15 Corporations Act, 2001, s180(1) (Cth). 
16 Corporations Act, 2001, s180(1) (Cth). 
17 Corporations Act, 2001, s180(1) (Cth). 
18 Corporations Act, 2001, s180(1) (Cth). 
19 Re Smith & Fawcett, (1942) Ch 304, 306. 
20 Re Smith & Fawcett (1942) Ch 304, 306. 
21 Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) 1 Ch 62, 74. 
22 Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) 1 Ch 62, 74. 
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Directors are required to believe that their actions will maximise the company’s 
profits in the short or long term. Langton and Trotman note the difficulties associ-
ated with such a vague time period. They state, “…exactly how long remains un-
specified. For that reason it is submitted that the phrase ‘best interests of the 
company’ should be equated in Australia with ruthless profit maximisation over 
some unspecified period.”23 As a result, strict interpretation of the law suggests that 
Australian directors must give exclusive consideration to advancing the financial, 
not social or moral interests of shareholders.  
IV DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSR MOVEMENT  
Although the law does not impose specific boundaries, external pressures have 
played an important role in developing the culture of “short term profit at any cost”. 
Managers have traditionally pursued short term profit maximisation by providing 
quick returns in order to justify their worth to shareholders. The outcome of more 
expensive long term profiteering has often been considered more speculative, yet 
can be legally justified due to the broad scope of power granted to directors.  
Traditionally, managers who seek to act in a socially responsible manner by adopt-
ing a long term approach to profit maximisation have encountered financial pres-
sures from impatient stockholders. Drucker notes, this long standing problem 
“…has been exacerbated by the growing concentration of publicly held stock in the 
hands of a few large, and demanding, institutional investors.”24 The culture of profit 
maximisation has traditionally been driven by the pressures of financial markets 
and the obligation to increase personal and client wealth. This developed in the 
United States in the mid-1970s where business bankruptcies hit their highest level 
since the Depression, due largely to the rise of international competition from Japan 
and Germany, and the decline of older more stable industries. High level investors 
saw opportunity in the crisis and purchased undervalued stocks for quick turn-
around. Vulnerable companies were absorbed via hostile takeovers and leveraged 
buyouts, shrewd financiers made hostile bids on companies in order to be paid to go 
away. The new industrial state has therefore prioritised personal wealth and profit 
maximisation over social issues.  
The rise of the culture of profit at any cost has been significant in shaping public 
opinion against big business. The emergence of “crash and bash” CEOs such as 
Sunbeam’s “Chainsaw” Al Dunlap, whilst beneficial for short term profits, drasti-
cally lowered public confidence in the corporate world to deliver social wealth. 
Dunlap and other CEOs built their reputations on ruthless layoffs and became much 
sought after entities for multinational corporations which sought short term profit 
maximisation regardless of the social consequences. As chairman of Scott Paper 
Company, Dunlap fired 11,200 employees and consequently drove the company’s 
stock price up 225%. Upon the sale of the company Dunlap received a $100 million 
23 Robert Langton  & Lindsay Trotman, Defining The Best Interests of the Corporation: Some Australian 
Reform Proposals, FLINDERS J.L.R, Vol.3, 163, 176 (1999). 
24 Peter Drucker, A Crisis of Capitalism, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 30, 1986 (Editorial). 
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bonus. When Dunlap joined Sunbeam, the company’s stock rose 60% in twenty-
four hours on expectation alone as the stock market routinely rewarded layoffs with 
lofty stock prices.25 Dunlap subsequently downsized Sunbeam by firing half of the 
company’s 12,000 employees and eliminating 87% of its products. On the back of 
the ruthless profit climate the Dow Jones moved from 1000 to 3000 and turned 
CEOs such as Dunlap into heroes of the capitalist movement.26 Bakan states, 
“Dunlap, who once posed on a magazine cover wielding a machine gun to symbol-
ise his take no prisoners approach to management, was cheered as a hero and fear-
less knight of the bottom line.”27 The effect of the cutthroat managerial style was 
damaging to the national workforce. Byrne notes, “Over the past two decades, more 
than 45 million Americans have been laid off from their jobs.”28 Therefore whilst 
high level individuals have profited from ruthless profit maximisation, the social 
costs have been considerable.   
Recent corporate scandals in Australia have also led to increased public cynicism of 
corporate motives. A report titled Eye on Australia, which appeared in Business 
Review Weekly in 2004, suggests that Australian corporations are severely alienat-
ing consumers and employees. Statistics demonstrate that 84% of consumers con-
sider corporations to be overly profit motivated and 75% disagree with the notion 
that Australian corporations are “caring”.29 It is not difficult to comprehend the 
background for the anger directed towards corporate Australia.  
Since 2001 consumers have witnessed the collapse of Ansett, FAI, Harris Scarfe, 
HIH and One.Tel as well as Enron and World.Com in the United States. In 1999 the 
“cash for comments” scandal implicated the banking sector and Australian corpo-
rate icons Qantas and Telstra. This event raised community scepticism and por-
trayed corporations as deceptive and immoral.  At a time of unprecedented profit, 
resulting partly from massive downsizing of staff and branch closures, the scandal 
perfectly illustrated the lack of sensitivity corporate Australia had developed to-
wards its community. Considerable media coverage has subsequently been afforded 
to corporate mishaps which has led to increased scepticism. Since 1999 Coles Myer 
has undergone a battle of proxy votes in order to remove Solomon Lew from its 
board, AMP has undergone dramatic restructuring and suffered large financial loss, 
James Hardie has attempted to avoid asbestos compensation payments by relocating 
the principal component of its company offshore, NRMA has undergone a demutu-
alisation process, Newmont has come under fire for damaging environmental activi-
ties in Indonesia, ASIC has alleged possible breaches of competition law by Amcor 
and there has been considerable press given to “corporate criminals” Ray Williams, 
Rodney Adler, Rene Rifkin and Steve Vizard. Furthermore directors’ payouts have 
25 JOHN BYRNE, CHAINSAW: THE NOTORIOUS CAREER OF AL DUNLAP IN THE ERA OF PROFIT-AT-ANY-
PRICE 44 (2003). 
26 Id., at 44.  
27 BAKAN, supra note 6, at 31. 
28 BYRNE, supra note 25, at 120. 
29 Simon Lloyd, Greedy Dishonesty Boring Faceless,  BUSINESS REVIEW WEEKLY, April 22, 2004 at 32. 
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exponentially risen at the same time, highlighting the extravagant lifestyle of senior 
managers and further isolating business from the community. BHP Billiton’s Brian 
Gilbertson reportedly received $30 million upon leaving the company after only 6 
months; previous BHP-Billiton CEO Paul Anderson received $18 million while 
Steve Jones received $30 million from Suncorp-Metway. George Trumbull, re-
membered for the disastrous acquisition of GIO, left AMP with $13.2 million whilst 
Frank Cicutto received a $3.27 million resignation payment after the crisis at 
NAB.30 Departing Commonwealth Bank CEO David Murray is expected to receive 
approximately $40 million plus reward shares over the next three years if the bank 
achieves its performance targets.31  
Although executives may be entitled to such payouts as a result of strong leadership 
and financial performance, at community level such figures are implausible. As 
Lloyd suggests, “…at a time when 73% of consumers say that paying off their 
mortgage is their biggest worry in life, it is little wonder they [consumers] bridle at 
the excesses of the corporate world.”32  
Corporate Response - Implementation of Insincere CSR 
The impact of recent corporate scandals and the entrenched culture of profit maxi-
misation has resulted in the development of a hostile social movement against big 
business. Consequently, corporations, in response to increased public scrutiny and 
heightened stakeholder expectations, have sought to modify internal strategies and 
engage with the community in order to avoid consumer backlash and continue to 
maximise profits.  
For many companies there is a considerable gap between corporate rhetoric and the 
reality of doing business in a more socially alert and sustainable manner. In line 
with shareholder primacy theory and in response to community cynicism, many 
corporations have elected to adopt strategic or “insincere” CSR practices in an 
attempt to “cash in” on the social movement. As Bakan suggests, insincere CSR 
began as no more than a means for directors to exploit the community by appearing 
responsible in order to maximise profits. He states, “Corporate social responsibility 
is their new creed, a self conscious corrective to earlier greed-inspired visions of the 
corporation. Despite this “shift” the corporation itself has not changed. It re-
mains…a legally designated person, designed to valorise self-interest and invalidate 
moral concern.”33 Shareholder primacy theory therefore contends that CSR is best 
used as a marketing tool to increase profits; executives should not be motivated by 
social responsibilities unless they are used as a “cloak” for legitimate business 
decisions. By extension shareholder theorists consider “sincere” CSR to be illegal 
due to the cost associated with adopting a responsible framework and the perceived 
lack of financial benefit gained.  
30 David Campbell, Corporate excesses cost faith as well as dollars THE AGE, Jan. 10, 2003 at 11; and 
Jennifer Hewett, Betrayal of Trust, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 18, 2003 at 34.    
31Asia Pulse, David Murray ends his career at Commonwealth Bank of Australia, June 14, 2005, avail-
able at <http://au.biz.yahoo.com/050614/17/4qu4.html> 
32 Lloyd, supra note 29, at 32. 
33 BAKAN, supra note 6, at 28. 
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Australian corporations law supports this position by compelling directors to maxi-
mise profits. Therefore any activity which interferes with this process is prima facie 
illegal. As a result, shareholder primacy theory contends that CSR should translate 
only into window-dressing. Friedman notes, “The executive who treats social 
responsibility and environmental values as a means to maximise shareholders” 
wealth – not as ends in themselves – commits no wrong…it’s like putting a good 
looking girl in front of an automobile …that’s not in order to promote pulchritude, 
that’s in order to sell cars.”34  
In practice however the implementation of insincere or strategic CSR is unlikely to 
lead to profit maximisation. It is more likely that such practices will result in in-
creased risk and structural stress resulting from a range of potential failures. The 
inherent nature of insincere CSR highlights the growing isolation of some boards 
from the communities in which they operate. Implementation of insincere practices 
reveals a corporate culture which seeks to evade personal or professional responsi-
bility and ultimately increases financial volatility. In reality the public is likely to 
catch onto such deceptive practices. Whilst initially most organisations attempted to 
adopt established public relations and brand management strategies to ensure that 
the organisation was seen as a worthy corporate citizen by investors and customers, 
ultimately this approach was greeted with increased scepticism due to the lack of 
credo associated with the campaigns. In 2000 the Enron Annual Report led inves-
tors and employees to believe that the company was pursuing a range of activities 
which protected their interests, in the spirit of “Respect, integrity, communication 
and excellence”.35 As Coates states however, the insincerity of the Board’s imple-
mentation of such systems, and their quest to maximise profits ultimately deceived 
investors. He notes, “In truth none of the executives adhered to these high minded 
principles, whereas rank and file employees took them seriously and practised 
them.”36  
The collapse of Enron due to the criminal actions of executives and the provision of 
misinformation to the market demonstrates the hypocrisy of the notion that insin-
cere CSR may be beneficial. In practice the desire to maximise profit at any cost is 
likely to lead to a culture of corruption whereby management systems fail as a 
result of executive or employee irresponsibility. As Velasquez notes, the insincere 
nature of such actions is likely to create an unsustainable corporate culture. He 
states, “Unethical practices arise when corporations fail to pay explicit attention to 
the ethical risks that are created by their own systems and practices.”37 In Australia 
the recent National Australia Bank (NAB) scandal revealed the inherent risk associ-
ated with internal systems built on financial pressure. Trader Luke Duffy falsely 
34 Id., at 34. 
35 Enron Annual Report (2000), available at <http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/> 
36 Breena Coates, Rogue Corporations, Corporate Rogues & Ethics Compliance: The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 2002, PUBLIC A.M.I.J, Vol. 8, No.3 (2003) at 184. 
37 Manuel Velasquez, Corporate Ethics: Losing It, Having It, Getting It, in ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS 
ETHICS 134 (Peter Madsen& Jay Shafritz eds., 1990). 
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claimed a $37 million profit in an attempt to cover a $5 million loss to avoid scru-
tiny. Chettle J, in sentencing Duffy stated, “The mixture of personal ambition, 
arrogance and corporate culture made you forget the legal responsibilities you had 
to the NAB, its management and its shareholders…You and your team saw your-
selves as invincible and justified in your criminal conduct by asserting that your 
principal motives were to make money for the bank.”38 Defence lawyer John Dick-
enson noted that traders had to take risks to achieve the targets the bank had set. He 
claimed, “The bank had put them in a situation where they had to gamble, and 
gamble hard.”39 Coates argues that in unethical systems, “…the culture is so struc-
tured that management finds it easy to provide rationalisations for deviant demands. 
Lower functionaries feel pressured into doing things (in the name of business) that 
they would not otherwise do.”40 Likewise Roddick claims that the religion of profit 
maximisation makes decent people do indecent things. He notes, “…because it has 
to maximise profits, everything is legitimate in the pursuit of that goal, every-
thing…”41 As a result, the Enron and NAB scandals demonstrate how wide a gap 
can exist between a company’s cleverly crafted do-gooder image and its actual 
operations.  
V THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS SINCERE CSR 
A Mistaken Concepts of Shareholder Primacy and The 
Benefits of a CSR Management Framework  
Misinterpretation of CSR principles by shareholder primacy theorists has cast a 
shadow over the perceived illegality of “sincere” CSR. Commentators have failed 
to appreciate the foundation of CSR in risk management and instead erroneously 
view “social welfare” as the only component of sincere engagement. As a result 
shareholder primacy theorists have failed to appreciate the business case for adopt-
ing CSR as a means to reduce risk.  
Parkinson defines “sincere” social responsibility, which he terms “profit sacrificing 
social responsibility” as “…behaviour that involves voluntarily sacrificing profits, 
either by incurring additional costs in the course of the company’s production 
processes, or by making transfers to non-shareholder groups out of the surplus 
thereby generated, in the belief that such behaviour will have consequences superior 
to those flowing from a policy of pure profit maximisation.”42 Likewise Lantos 
contends that “…firms practising altruistic CSR help to alleviate various social ills 
38 Daniella Miletic, 16 months’ jail for NAB forex dealer over $360m scandal, THE AGE, June 16 2005, 
Business Section p .1 
39 Daniella Miletic, NAB man’s $5m losing bet, THE AGE, June 15, 2005, Business Section, p.1. 
 
40 Breena Coates, Hard Choices and Dirty Hands Dilemmas: The Implications of the USA Patriot Act of 
2001, THE JURIST, January 2002, at 167. 
41 BAKAN, supra note 6, at 55. 
42 JOHN PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY 
LAW 261 (1994). 
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within a community or society, such as lack of sufficient funding for educational 
institutions, inadequate monies for the arts, chronic unemployment, urban blight, 
drug and alcohol problems, and illiteracy, among others.”43 In practice however, the 
adoption of sincere CSR is more appropriately defined as the implementation of 
sound management structures aimed at minimising risk in areas such as governance, 
environmental impact, social impact and workplace practices. Shareholder primacy 
theorists are therefore mistaken in their belief that CSR is merely the departure of 
profits from the company in order to engage in social welfare.  
Australian social responsibility ratings agency RepuTex, best identifies the ele-
ments of “sincere” CSR. It states, “An organisation should, as part of its core oper-
ating activities, display a commitment to exemplary conduct and the highest 
standards of ethical practice in the diverse areas of environmental sustainability, 
workplace practices and community wellbeing. Transparent and accountable gov-
ernance structures should incorporate the highest standards of ethics that result in a 
genuine capacity to self govern and be trusted by the community. Value should be 
added to the organisation’s understanding of social responsibility through a process 
of active and responsive engagement with a broad range of stakeholder groups.”44 
As a result social welfare constitutes only one component of a strategy designed to 
minimise exposure to social risk. Minimising risk ultimately places a company in a 
stronger, more sustainable market position than an unengaged competitor who is 
likely to be exposed to a greater number of external variables. As Black argues, the 
adoption of such practices positions a corporation to effectively manage potential 
risk. He notes, “Social risk management procedures impose clear disciplines upon 
an organisation and its stakeholders which should result in improved relationships 
with stakeholders and a better understanding of the environment in which it oper-
ates. Such management procedures should better equip an organisation to anticipate 
the inclinations of those who prescribe regulations and performance expectations 
upon it, and will sharpen its response to third party pressures.”45  
Companies are increasingly recognising that they need to act with regard to sincere 
CSR in order to attract increased business, customer and investor support. Resource 
companies, such as Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and BP, due to the high impact nature 
of their operations, have invested a considerable amount of energy in order to meet 
the high expectations of environmental and social stakeholders. In doing so compa-
nies also seek to increase goodwill and reverse public mistrust of big business. BP 
Chairman Sir John Browne, believes that people’s angst about corporations – the 
“…quiet monster living in the public mood”, can be tamed by sincere CSR en-
gagement. “If we’re going to win back public acceptance and trust, we have to be 
43 Geoffrey Lantos, The Ethicality of Altruistic Corporate Social Responsibility, JOURNAL C.M, Vol. 19 
No. 3, 206 (2002). 
44 RepuTex website at <http://www.reputex.com.au>   
45 Peter Black, Social Responsibility Ratings and Their Relevance to Mainstream Investment Analysis, 
REPUTEX BACKGROUNDER, Vol. 1, 1 (2005). 
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progressive.”46 As a result companies are taking a proactive and transparent ap-
proach to CSR reporting. In the BBC’s Reith Lectures in 2000, Browne noted, 
“Companies are radically altering their annual reports to include detailed informa-
tion about environmental and social performance alongside their financial accounts. 
Performance is now measured on many dimensions and success is defined in a 
holistic way. One of the great gains from the connected economy is transparency, 
because that is the key to confidence and trust, and for the granting of permission 
by society for companies to pursue their activities and continue to make pro-
gress.”47 In light of the insincere approach to CSR undertaken by companies such 
as Enron, Browne’s comments demonstrate the importance of sincere engagement 
and the potential for financial gain as a result. BP is, for example, more likely to 
secure future access to government controlled oil deposits and therefore more likely 
to achieve superior profit maximisation due to its social and environmental en-
gagement and sustainability programs.  
At policy level, BP has adopted a comprehensive program aimed at ensuring sus-
tainable business practices. As noted, the long term effect of such strategies is at the 
least likely to separate the company from its competitors. BP has undertaken to 
reduce its emissions of greenhouse gasses by 10% by the year 2010. To help reach 
the announced goals BP has established an in-house carbon dioxide trading pro-
gram that requires business units to buy and sell credits in order to meet their al-
lowed emission levels. In Australia BP is also the first participant in the 
“greenhouse friendly – greenhouse free” initiative in which revenue from sales of 
its cleaner fuel is specifically directed by the Commonwealth Bank into cleaner 
energy projects.48 Under Browne, BP marketing campaigns have capitalised on the 
company’s responsible practices by painting the company in a green, environmen-
tally friendly light. The company subsequently appears more attractive to responsi-
ble investors, and consumers who prefer “clean” brands. BP has also changed its 
name from British Petroleum to Beyond Petroleum in an attempt to reduce the 
emphasis on unsustainable fuel products and imply a social vision. Sincere en-
gagement and leadership on climate change is ultimately undertaken as a mecha-
nism to ensure that the company is well placed to overcome potential environmental 
risk exposures, and to give the company a distinctive edge in the eyes of govern-
ment officials and community groups. This is also likely to lead to innovation and 
long term shareholder wealth.   
B Impact of CSR Policies & Strategy 
The advantages associated with adopting CSR policy may be identified by examin-
ing the benefits of specific programs such as those relating to Occupational Health 
and Safety (OH&S) and philanthropy. Although considered a profit sacrifice by 
shareholder primacy theorists, the relationship of such programs to a company’s 
46 BAKAN, supra note 6, at 144. 
47 BBC Radio 4, Reith Series Lectures 2000, available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/reith_2000/lecture3.stm 20/6/05>  
48 See: <www.bp.com.au> (last visited May 16, 2005). 
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bottom line is evidence of the interconnectedness of social and financial perform-
ance.  
C Occupational Health & Safety 
The implementation of OH&S strategies by a corporation demonstrates the finan-
cial benefit of CSR engagement and reduced risk exposure. Sincere implementation 
of safety measures by a company goes beyond Friedman’s concept of mere window 
dressing and suggests that profit sacrifice for sincere CSR purposes may be finan-
cially rewarding. From the shareholder primacy perspective, the belief that an 
unsafe workplace will result in increased shareholder wealth due to reduced cost 
demonstrates the contradictory nature of both primacy theory and insincere CSR. 
Concern regarding directors breaching their primary duties to shareholders by 
sacrificing profits is negated when a company’s performance is measured by non-
economic factors such as employee satisfaction and corporate reputation. As Horri-
gan notes, “Compliance with anti-pollution and workplace safety laws to prevent 
harm to employees and the environment unquestionably increases the costs of 
business but nobody seriously frames this in terms of unjustified distraction from 
the financial bottom line or something which compromises the primary directive to 
satisfy shareholder interests.”49
Companies in high impact sectors such as BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto have tradi-
tionally adopted rigorous OH&S policies in order to protect staff and manage the 
inherent risk in the nature of their work. Rio Tinto for example has implemented 
performance standards to cover typical occupational exposures in the industry. 
These include strategies to protect employees from gas vapour exposure, high noise 
levels, manual handling and vibration, hazardous substances, radiation, thermal 
stress and fitness for working.50 These programs are supported by the adoption of a 
health and safety management system which sets out specific requirements of risk 
assessment, workplace monitoring and medical surveillance.51 Of note however is 
the extension of OH&S policy into industries which have typically been indifferent 
to safety due to their perceived low impact operations. Companies such as Hewlett-
Packard and NAB, which prima facie appear to have little need for strict OH&S 
policy, provide a good example of the modern approach to safety management. 
NAB for example has adopted a health and safety management system which is 
integrated with organisational activities. The company has adopted strategies such 
as safety targets and accountabilities for all employees, dissemination of safety 
information via employee forum groups, safety training and rehabilitation pro-
grams.52 Such programs ultimately reduce potential exposure to workplace risk and 
49 Brian Horrigan, Fault Lines in the Intersection Between Corporate Governance and Social Responsi-
bility, 25 UNIVERSITY N.S.W.L REV.  515, 539 (2002). 
50 <http://www.riotinto.com/community/occHealth.aspx> (accessed on May 10, 2005). 
51 Id.  
52 <http://www.nabgroup.com/0,,48934,00.html> (accessed on May 20, 2005). 
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therefore reduce the likelihood of financial outlay. The willingness of corporations 
such as Rio Tinto and the NAB to adopt OH&S programs demonstrates the benefit 
to be gained from observing a safe workplace.  
In the modern business setting, a proactive approach to health and safety, regardless 
of the perceived operational impact of the company, will have significant benefit to 
a corporation. It has long been recognised that effective management of health and 
safety can deliver a wide range of benefits to a company via reduced risk exposure. 
As Grammeno notes, while zero injury targets are the primary goal, improvements 
may also result in increased productivity, product and service improvements and 
increased morale and job satisfaction. This may also result in reduced absenteeism 
and lower staff turnover.53 Employee identification in company goals and objec-
tives is valued as a means to maximise profit. Strategies such as OH&S, which 
increase morale and employee confidence in the corporation may therefore lead to 
financial benefit.  
The 2003 Bertelsmann CSR Report clearly supports this notion. It states, “Leader-
ship through partnership strengthens employee identification with their company; 
identification meanwhile promotes business success. The top one quarter of all 
companies, whose employees identify most strongly with their companies, gener-
ated a high return on sales on average, while the bottom one quarter, whose em-
ployees felt least identification, averaged return on sales close to zero. In other 
words: Leading through partnership results in a better bottom line.”54 Companies 
which engage in insincere OH&S practices are unlikely to foster such employee 
identification, and are therefore likely to miss the associated financial benefits. As a 
result of a less stringent safety culture, such corporations are also likely to face 
increased risk exposures. Poor OH&S performance is likely to have a negative 
financial impact on a corporation via increased costs associated with employee lost 
time due to injury, equipment damage, accident investigation and documentation, 
and waste of product.55 In cases where employer negligence is to blame, penalties 
and compensation for breaches of health and safety laws will directly impact on a 
company’s bottom line. In 2000 the State Rail Authority of New South Wales was 
fined $420,000 for a single breach of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 
(NSW).  As a result it is difficult to conclude that the implementation of OH&S 
strategies is a distraction from maximising company profitability. Conversely 
OH&S policy will be advantageous to a company’s bottom line and corporate 
reputation as the correlation between risk, financial volatility and CSR performance 
is increasingly relevant. 
 
 
53 GABRIELLE GRAMMENO, Managing Business Risks: Risk Management and Corporate Culture, 
MASTER OHS AND ENVIRONMENT GUIDE, CCH, 2002, AT 238.     
54 2003 Bertelsmann CSR Report, at 3, available at 
<http://www.bertelsmann.com/bertelsmann_corp/wms/bertelsmann/index.php? 
ci=132&language=2> 
55 GRAMMENO, supra note 53, at 238.   
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D Corporate Philanthropy  
Shareholder primacy theorists contend that corporate philanthropy and social wel-
fare is a means of profit sacrifice and illegal unless it is in the service of corporate 
self- interest. In the modern business setting, however, it appears that the scope for 
philanthropic acts may have expanded to include pure social welfare, due to the 
tangible and intangible benefits associated with such engagement. Therefore all 
forms of corporate philanthropy may now be considered in the service of self-
interest.  
The traditional legal position regarding corporate philanthropy endorses shareholder 
primacy theory. In 1883 Bowen LJ in Hutton v West Cork Railway stated, “The law 
does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and 
ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company…charity has no 
business to sit at Boards of directors qua charity. There is however a kind of chari-
table dealing which is for the interest of those who practice it, and to that ex-
tent…charity may sit at the Board, but for no other purpose.”56 In line with 
corporations law and directors’ duties, companies are provided limited flexibility 
and protection with regard to charitable dealings. Part 2D.1 of the Corporations Act 
sets out the duties and powers of company officers. These statutory duties sit along-
side the common law and equitable duties which require directors to act “bona fide 
for the benefit of the company as a whole”.57 Directors are protected under the 
business judgement rule where a legitimate business decision has been made.58 The 
business judgement rule in Australia apples only to the duty of due care and dili-
gence under s.180(1), which states that “A director or other officer of a corporation 
must exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and 
diligence that a reasonable person would exercise…”59 To satisfy the rule the 
judgement must be in good faith, for a proper purpose and the director must ration-
ally believe that the decision is in the best interests of the company. The director 
must be informed and must not have a material personal interest in the decision.60 
Therefore the charitable dealing must be in the interest of the corporation and its 
shareholders. This is likely to be the approach taken by the court if a reasonable 
corporate donation were ever challenged in Australia.  
Difficulty defining the phrase “best interests of the corporation” has led to uncer-
tainty regarding what constitutes a reasonable philanthropic act. The Australian 
Shareholders Association (ASA) contends that directors should not engage in any 
form of corporate philanthropy. They state, “The directors of companies are ap-
pointed by shareholders to look after the interests of the shareholders. They are 
there to make money for shareholders, not donate it to other people. Companies 
56 Hutton v. West Cork Railway, (1883) 23 Ch D 654, 673. 
57 Mills v Mills, (1938) 60 CLR 150, 188. 
58 Corporations Act 2001 s180(2) (Cth).   
59 Corporations Act 2001 s180(1) (Cth). 
60 Corporations Act 2001 s180(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (Cth). 
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should not be deciding what to do with shareholders’ money…The shareholder may 
well want to be philanthropic; but that’s their choice and it should come out of the 
income which has been delivered to them by the companies in which they invest.”61  
In Australia however, shareholders have very little direct control over management 
decisions which are made in the “best interests of the company”. According to 
NRMA v Parker62 shareholders are unable to directly instruct management on how 
to exercise the powers vested in them, yet are able to indirectly influence decisions 
by passing a resolution at an AGM to alter the company’s constitution or by seeking 
a directors’ removal. Shareholder primacy theorists argue that any donation for 
purely philanthropic or social welfare purposes is illegal. Friedman contends that 
corporate philanthropy may be tolerated only when it serves the financial interests 
of the company which in turn benefits shareholders63 – apathetic social welfare 
must be deemed illegal. While the law prima facie agrees, given the intangible 
benefits associated with philanthropy, in practice it is difficult for the courts to set 
clear parameters of when philanthropy may or may not constitute a “benefit”. The 
intangible benefits granted to a company have made the courts reluctant to interfere 
in matters that involve the exercise of commercial judgement. Philanthropy may 
result in increased goodwill to the business, improved reputation, employee loyalty 
or a long term shift in the wellbeing of the community where the business operates. 
If a decision has been made to donate to a charity for these reasons, the court will 
be cautious in second guessing the business decision of the directors.  
The courts’ reluctance to set parameters as to what constitutes a benefit may have 
resulted in a broadening of the powers indirectly granted to officers via directors’ 
duties. Intangible benefits, for example goodwill, may now be considered to have a 
direct impact on a company’s bottom line; as a result, actions which increase good-
will such as pure social welfare may be intra vires. The link between goodwill and 
profit maximisation has previously been considered ambiguous by the courts. The 
1953 US case A.P Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow64 suggests that goodwill has 
no impact on the bottom line; as a result corporate philanthropy may be unjustified. 
Obiter from the case states, “Corporate giving appears to be remote from the com-
pany’s visible business needs…That those expenditures may also result in an en-
hanced receptivity for the enterprises’ products or services or loyalty from 
employees is a happy additional benefit, but does not appear to be at the core of the 
drive to donate. The benefit may reflect managerial long-term strategic conceptions, 
but they need not be arranged by management to mesh with the daily or short term 
operations of the enterprise. In short, such goodwill expenditures are not function-
ally integrated with any particular corporation’s business operations and are consid-
erably more remote from the bottom line.”65 Despite this, the date of the judgement 
may be indicative of the shift in business practices in recent years. In the modern 
era, corporations have shown a strong desire to capitalise on the goodwill associ-
61 Quoted in Denis Tracey, Giving It Away: In Praise of Philanthropy, SCRIBE (2003) at 11. 
62 NRMA v. Parker, (1986) 6 NSWLR 517, 522. 
63 Friedman, supra note 4, at 35. 
64 A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co v. Barlow 98 A2d 581 (NJ 1953). 
65 Id., at 583-86. 
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ated with charity by trading on the notion of the “halo effect”. Harvey and McCro-
han define the “halo effect” as follows: “Increasingly corporate giving is seen not 
solely as philanthropic but rather as an established part of doing business, being 
present in the community and acting in the corporation’s own self-interest. An 
additional benefit of corporate giving, regardless of the efficiency level of the 
philanthropy supported, is that perceptions of corporate social responsibility are 
higher for firms with greater levels of giving, even for those that had earlier vio-
lated the antitrust statues. This finding supports the notion that corporate giving 
provides a halo effect that can overcome prior transgressions.”66  
More recently philanthropy has become a significant component of advertising and 
marketing campaigns via brand association with a particular cause or non-profit 
event. For example, Australian supermarket chain Ritchie’s proudly publicises its 
philanthropic activities on television commercials and on the company’s website in 
order to increase goodwill and ultimately profits. Their branding as a “community” 
store is evidence of the business case for philanthropic activities. As Brudney notes, 
“By publicly and visibly connecting to those activities the corporation seeks to 
attract the approval of customers of its goods, products or services and the loyalty 
of its employees.”67  
As alluded to by Harvey and McCrohan, goodwill may also enable a corporation to 
mitigate potential brand damage in the event of a corporate mishap.  McDonalds, 
for example, has effectively promoted itself as a responsible corporate citizen by 
sponsoring over 160 Ronald McDonald Houses around the world which care for 
young cancer patients. Negative publicity as a result of the McLibel proceedings in 
the United Kingdom threatened to seriously damage the company’s philanthropic 
image. The scandal, where two Greenpeace activists were sued for handing out 
libellous information, ultimately forced disclosure of the company’s poor social and 
environmental practices, and portrayed an inequitable mismatch of corporate power 
versus members of the community.  McDonald’s image was further tainted by 
claims that spies had infiltrated London Greenpeace in an attempt to gain evidence 
to use at trial. However as Compton notes, McDonald’s track record and association 
with charities reduced the impact of the scandal. He states, “McDonalds is widely 
accepted as a responsible corporate citizen, so much so that when it got into trouble 
with environmentalists, the community instantly forgave it. The company had built 
up a bank of goodwill, which it can draw upon when necessary.”68 Likewise Tel-
stra, which received negative publicity in February of this year after seeking to 
withdraw its sponsorship of the Lifeline program, may have reduced reputational 
damage as a result of the activities of its Telstra Foundation. The Foundation, which 
focuses on indigenous and childhood development, is likely to have reduced major 
66 James Harvey & Kevin McCrohan, Changing Conditions for Fund Raising and Philanthropy in 
CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 59 (1990). 
67 Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.,  1192 (2002). 
68 Everald Compton, Community Partnerships, IPA REVIEW, Vol. 48/4 (1996) at 45. 
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brand damage as a result of Telstra’s standing as a good corporate citizen. McColl 
also notes, “…it could be argued that its work helps deflect criticism of Telstra over 
claims of anti-competitive pricing tactics and inadequate rural and regional ser-
vices.”69 As such, goodwill may have a significant impact on the bottom line, albeit 
indirectly.  
E Legal Acceptance of Pure Philanthropy & Social Welfare  
Recent tsunami donations indicate that corporations may be legally authorised to 
engage in acts of pure social welfare previously considered ultra vires. Intangible 
benefits of philanthropy such as goodwill may indirectly advantage a company’s 
bottom line, therefore acts of social welfare and pure philanthropy may be legal 
under the guise of enhancing goodwill. As noted above, shareholder primacy theo-
rists consider acts of pure social welfare to be ultra vires. Defined by Parkinson, 
social activism “…refers to conduct which is putatively beneficial to society or 
particular interest groups, but falls outside the scope of the company’s ordinary 
commercial operations.”70 With regard to the tsunami, the ASA openly criticised 
corporations which donated money expecting nothing in return. According to ASA 
spokesman Stephen Matthews, “Donations should only be made in situations that 
are likely to benefit the company through greater market exposure...there is a role 
for business to make a contribution in relation to the tsunami, particularly those 
businesses who have activities in South East Asia. Companies like Bluescope Steel 
come to mind.”71 However many companies, despite ASA criticism, engaged in 
“illegal” acts of philanthropy by “sacrificing profit”. National Australia Bank, 
Telstra, Commonwealth Bank, Foster’s Group, Visy Industries, Westfield Group, 
Travelex and News Corporation all donated at least $1 million to aid tsunami vic-
tims and in the eyes of the ASA gained no benefit for shareholders.72   
The ASA’s comments demonstrate the organisation’s, and shareholder primacy 
theory’s lack of acknowledgement of the business case for charitable dealings. 
Many corporations gained substantial media attention as a result of donations and 
therefore indirectly enhanced goodwill. A tactful approach to advertising charitable 
contributions will most likely result in gains due to the perceived sincere nature of 
the company. Elliott notes, “How advertising addresses the relief efforts is impor-
tant partly because of the increasing popularity of cause related marketing, as a 
growing number of consumers look to spend money with companies they perceive 
are contributing to the greater good. But doing well by doing good, particularly post 
9-11, usually works the best when the public considers the attempt to be altruistic 
rather than self-promotional.”73 Furthermore, given the community reaction to the 
69 Gina McColl, Corporate Philanthropy, BUSINESS REVIEW WEEKLY, July 7, 2005, at 78. 
70 Parkinson, supra note 42, at 261. 
71 ABC Online, Shareholders’ group clarifies tsunami donation stance, ABC ONLINE, Jan. 7, 2005 
available at <www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1278362.htm> 
72 Therese Wilson, The Best Interests of the Company and Corporate Social Responsibility, CLTA 
Conference, Feb. 7, 2005, at 8, available at 
<http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/~parsons/CLTA/WilsonPaper.pdf> 
73 Stuart Elliott, The Media Business: Advertising; The delicate task of showing corporate concern for 
the tsunami victims, without seeming promotional, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 4, 2005. 
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tsunami disaster, many corporations were morally obliged to donate in order to 
avoid employee and consumer backlash. Donations were therefore used as a means 
to reduce business risk. This notion demonstrates the contemporary application of 
corporate philanthropy.  
In the modern era, acts of pure social welfare outside the scope of business opera-
tions and interests, are likely to benefit a corporation by enhancing goodwill, em-
ployee morale and reducing external risks such as consumer backlash. Indicative of 
the enhanced role of philanthropy as a means to manage risk was the public reaction 
to the ASA’s comments against pure philanthropic acts by corporations. One letter 
to the Sydney Morning Herald stated, “As a shareholder I am proud that companies 
are reflecting the community feeling and making a significant difference. It is a 
chance for leaders in all sectors to inspire. The picture of greed and self interest 
painted by the response of the ASA fills me with disgust.”74 As a result it appears 
that a large section of the population expects corporate philanthropy, and now 
perhaps even pure social welfare. Wilson notes, “It seems that the community 
expectation is that corporations, as legal entities, should exhibit the same generosity 
and compassion in the event of such a tragedy as natural persons.”75 As a result 
shareholder theory, supported by the ASA, appears to be outdated and inflexible in 
light of changing stakeholder expectations. In the modern era it appears that all 
forms of philanthropy may indirectly benefit a company’s bottom line under the 
guise of goodwill and the management of potential risk exposures. Many stake-
holders appear to be increasingly aware that charitable giving is good for business. 
Therefore restricting unselfish activity may operate to the detriment of a company 
in terms of damage to goodwill, reputation and risk exposure.  
F Tangible Benefits of Sincere Social Responsibility  
Given the evolving science of the CSR paradigm, hard evidence of ensuing finan-
cial benefit is difficult to collate. However, as noted above with regard to OH&S 
and philanthropy, corporate case studies have demonstrated considerable benefit 
from adopting socially responsible projects. The UK Department of Trade and 
Industry has published several case studies from leading companies such as BP, 
British Telecom, J Sainsbury, Laing Group, Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever and TXU 
Europe, which illustrate the various benefits that can emerge from socially respon-
sible strategies. Benefits achieved included:  
• Increased staff morale and a better ability to recruit and retain 
staff; 
• Increased reputational standing within communities leading to in-
creased potential for customers; 
74 Editorial, Even shareholders can give without expecting a return, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 
January 8, 2005. 
75 Wilson, supra note 72, at 9. 
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• Improved relationships and higher approval rating with local area 
decision makers (councils and local community organisations);  
• Demonstrable cost savings and cuts in waste from new sustain-
able management strategies; 
• Increased customer confidence; 
• Improved communication channels to local community and more 
durable social licence to operate; 
• Protection of local supply chains, mitigation of disruption to op-
erations, better risk management; 
• Improved partnership with suppliers leading to higher sales; 
• Increased business from clients who want a development partner 
that can deliver effective social and economic programmes.76 
 
Furthermore, it appears that organisations with a positive CSR profile offer a better 
return for investors. The increasing number of socially responsible investment 
(SRI) funds and CSR products reflects the interconnectivity of financial and social 
performance. The popularity of SRIs is due largely to the reactive nature of inves-
tors who are keen to invest in sustainable companies as a means to punish “dirty” 
brands. As investors increasingly look to social and environmental issues when 
making investment decisions, the benefits of an outwardly sustainable business 
strategy are enhanced. The Ethical Investment Association states that SRI funds in 
Australia are now worth $21.5 billion, up 41% since June 30, 2004, with religious 
bodies and employer superannuation funds being the largest investors on SRI crite-
ria.77 In the US, 13% of the US$16.6 trillion invested, is done so in a socially re-
sponsible manner.78 Research suggests that SRI funds are outperforming traditional 
investment vehicles. The Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index (DJSGI) in the US 
measures the CSR performance of companies which represent the top 10% of 
sustainable companies over 64 sectors. According to the DJSGI website, the top 
200 corporations on the Index have outperformed the Dow Jones Global Index by 
approximately 10% since its inception in October 1999.79 Likewise, research under-
taken by AMP Capital’s Sustainable Funds Transfer Team has found that 
“…companies with a higher CSR rating outperformed [other stocks in the investa-
ble universe] by more than 3% per annum over 4 and 10 year periods.”80 As a result 
the majority of investment managers worldwide anticipate a move into the global 
financial mainstream within the next decade.81  
In Australia the extension of CSR into traditional financial products is evident via 
the release by ABN AMRO of a Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO) based on 
76 Available at <http://www.societyandbusiness.gov.uk> (accessed on June 10, 2005). 
77 Liam Egan, Investors warm to SRI, available at  
<ww.moneymanagement.com.au/articles/c8/0c0281c8.asp> 
78 John Arbouw, Corporate Citizenship: More than a good idea, COMPANY DIRECTOR, Vol. 17(4), May, 
2001, at 19. 
79 Available at <http://indexcs.dowjones.com> (accessed on May 8, 2005). 
80 AMP Capital Investors, Financial payback from social and environmental factors in INSIGHTS, Mar. 
30, 2005, at 2. 
81 Mercer IC, Fearless forecast survey 2005, available at <http://www.mercerhr.co.uk> 
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corporate debt issues of sustainable companies. The product is the first in the world 
to have both a credit rating and CSR rating attached to it in order deliver investors a 
more comprehensive appraisal of current and future risk exposures which might 
impact on a company’s capacity to maintain a sustainable financial position.82 
Mainstream uptake of the CSR agenda ultimately reflects the growing significance 
of social responsibility as an indicator of financial prosperity.  
VI POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS  
Reform of Australian corporations law via the entrenchment of ethical standards 
has been proposed by commentators as a means to ensure companies act not only in 
the best interests of shareholders, but for the community as a whole. Corcoran 
contends that stakeholder interests should be expressly acknowledged by Australian 
courts. She states that: “An ethical standard phrased in general terms would pro-
mote high ethical standards while maintaining wide discretion. It would recognise 
the powerful position of corporations within the fabric of our social and political 
arrangements. A general standard would be flexible and adaptable to changing 
circumstances. It would assist in closing the expectation gap that exists between the 
way people think corporations should act and the legal rules with which corporate 
managers must comply.”83  
Corcoran identifies the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance as an example of a general standard which may be entrenched in statute. 
Principle 2.01(b)(3) states that a corporation “…may devote a reasonable amount of 
resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic pur-
poses.”84 Accordingly the pursuit of economic objective must be constrained by 
social imperatives and may be qualified by social needs.85 In Australia the Austra-
lian Stock Exchange (ASX) has developed a set of guidelines, the Principles of 
Good Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, designed as a reference 
point for companies to understand stakeholder expectations and promote investor 
confidence.86 Recommendation 10 proposes that companies “…recognise legal and 
other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.”87 This entails the adoption of a 
company code of conduct in order to guide compliance with legal and other obliga-
tions. The guideline for the content of the code of conduct suggests that companies 
outline responsibilities to shareholders and the financial community in general, 
responsibilities to clients and consumers, responsibilities of employment practices 
82 Available at <http://www.reputex.com.au/7-home.asp> (accessed on June 16, 2005). 
83 Corcoran, supra note 14, at 63. 
84American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATION (1994). 
85 Id.  
86ASX, Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, available at  
<http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/governance> (accessed on June 20, 2005). 
87 Id., at R.10.1. 
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such as OH&S, responsibilities to the community, and how the company complies 
with relevant legislation.88 Adoption of the recommendations is voluntary, as such a 
corporation may chose to adopt only part of the framework, or part of a specific 
recommendation. The impact of voluntary codes is difficult to assess. Prima facie 
such guidelines are unlikely to persuade rogue corporations to adopt socially re-
sponsible strategies; however they will ultimately serve as a means to advance the 
CSR agenda.  
Current Australian and British Governments have to varying degrees shown some 
desire to enhance the legal standing of CSR. In the UK legislative reform has been 
proposed via the Company Law Reform Bill, which seeks to place a positive burden 
on directors to take stakeholder interests into account. The Bill is currently “in 
progress” in the House of Commons. Part B3(1) of the Bill outlines the duty of a 
director to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members. 
Subsection (3) of the duty states that “In fulfilling the duty, a director must take 
account the likely consequences of any decision in both the short and long term and 
have regard to the interests of employees, foster its business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, and consider the impact of its operations on the 
community and the environment.”89 Although yet to be passed by the House of 
Commons, the Bill represents a positive step forward with regard to recognising the 
interests of stakeholders and the wider community. The Bill also questions the 
validity of shareholder primacy theory in law as it implies that “ruthless” profit 
maximisation may now be toned down if it is inconsistent with stakeholder inter-
ests.  
In 2001, the French Government adopted a more prescriptive approach by mandat-
ing social disclosure as part of its Nouvelles Régulations Économiques (NRE). 
Article 116 of the NRE requires all listed French corporations to report on the social 
and environmental impact of their activities. Proponents have praised the commit-
ment as a baseline mechanism to implement sustainable reporting standards and 
foster openness and transparency. More importantly, the Decree places CSR 
squarely on the agenda of every publicly listed French corporation, effectively 
institutionalising triple bottom line reporting concepts, and providing French corpo-
rations with a competitive advantage over their European and international competi-
tors. The NRE imposes a legal obligation for corporations to publicly disclose 
against a limited set of qualitative and quantitative indicators relating to the social 
and environmental impacts of their activities. The regulations make it mandatory 
for corporations to report on: Employees (equity, diversity, OH&S, training, remu-
neration); Community (impacts, local development initiatives, stakeholder engage-
ment); Environment (data on air, water and ground emissions, energy consumption, 
water and raw materials, management systems); and International Labour Standards 
(how the company and any subsidiaries/contractors promote conventions). Whilst 
the NRE has received criticism for not establishing specific indicators and method-
ologies, the Decree is nonetheless evidence of the emerging importance of sustain-
ability issues in mainstream international governance.  
88 Id., at R.10.1. 
89 Company Law Reform Bill Part B(3) s3(a) & (b). 
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In Australia the Commonwealth Government has shown a willingness to explore 
possible amendments to directors’ duties, yet has taken no steps to actively promote 
or recognise sustainability concerns. In March 2005 the Corporations and Markets 
Advisory Committee (CAMAC) was asked to advise the Parliament on the extent to 
which the Corporations Act should include CSR or explicit obligations to force 
directors to take into account the interests of certain classes of stakeholders other 
than shareholders.90 The exploration of legislative reform demonstrates that the 
government acknowledges the importance of stakeholder interests, and recognises 
the need to improve business standards to meet enhanced community expectations.  
VII CONCLUSION  
Calls to reform Australian corporations law in order to entrench CSR principles 
may be unwarranted in light of the broad scope afforded by the current system. 
Meredith Hellicar, Chairman of James Hardie recently suggested that directors’ 
duties should be expanded to include responsibilities to the interests of all stake-
holders, enabling company boards to be more generous with company funds. She 
noted, “What one needs is a safe harbour for directors to be able to integrate corpo-
rate social responsibility into their decision making without fear that they are going 
to be sued both personally and as a company by their shareholders.”91 Whilst Helli-
car’s comments may appear to be self-serving in light of the recent James Hardie 
asbestos scandal, the perceived illegality of altruistic CSR demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of CSR concepts and a failure to appreciate the substantial benefits 
associated with the effective management of non-financial risk. In practice current 
directors’ duties provide safe harbour for corporate officers who engage in activities 
which maximise profits. Given the relationship between financial and social per-
formance, directors may rely on the knowledge that CSR activity should be held to 
be in the best interests of the company. As such any perceived illegality of CSR is 
unwarranted.  
Bartholomeuz notes than in business practice directors may consider a broad range 
of stakeholders. He writes, “CSR Pty Ltd has been making voluntary payments to 
asbestos victims for decades. Australian resource companies have become world 
leaders in adding a social responsibility dimension to their interaction with the 
communities within which they operate. Australian companies provided a torrent of 
cash for the tsunami appeals…”92 The link between social engagement and finan-
cial performance ultimately suggests that companies will be motivated to self regu-
late and implement socially responsible strategies regardless of legislative reform. 
90 Letter of referral from the Hon Chris Pearce MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Commonwealth 
Treasurer, available at <http://www.camac.gov.au> (accessed on May 20, 2005). 
91 Stephen Bartholomeuz, New Director plans could backfire, THE AGE ONLINE, Apr. 6, 2005, available 
at <www.theage.com.au> 
92 Id.  
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Furthermore, as Wenzel states, self regulation may prove to be more effective than 
legislation. He notes, “Allowing time for a corporate culture to develop within 
companies, in which consideration of stakeholder interests is respected as a legiti-
mate and central component of the decision making process…is preferable to the 
imposition of black letter law.”93 The current framework provides legal protection 
for directors who engage in CSR activities, and, in combination with public pres-
sure, should serve to adequately protect and entrench CSR. It should be acknowl-
edged however, that legislative reform and an expansion of directors’ duties may at 
the least raise the bar for CSR performance, and ensure public accountability and 
transparency is taken seriously by corporate boards and business leaders.   
In light of the tangible benefits of CSR engagement, shareholder primacy theory 
appears to be no longer relevant to the current business environment. Whilst share-
holder theory contends that social factors should not interfere in business opera-
tions, in the modern setting, a company’s core objective of profit maximisation 
must be underpinned by a proactive approach to CSR in order to manage and miti-
gate a broader array of risk factors. Companies which engage with the community 
and adopt a sincere CSR management approach gain an advantage from an en-
hanced capacity to be aware of and control risk associated with new or altered 
demands from government regulators, employees, community stakeholders, share-
holder activists and consumers. Risk management therefore reduces unexpected 
crises and strengthens the company’s overall presence and stability. By contrast 
companies adopting a non-integrated or insincere approach to CSR are more likely 
to be subject to stress resulting from the diverse range of issues relevant to external 
parties. Therefore the possibility of corporate risk failure and potential financial 
volatility is increased.  
As Davis argues, in the current setting, shareholder primacy theory may in fact 
diminish profits. He notes, “Paradoxically, the language of shareholder value may 
hinder companies from maximising shareholder value in this respect. Practiced as 
an unthinking mantra, it can lead managers to focus excessively on improving short 
term performance of their business, neglecting important longer-term opportunities 
and issues. The latter would include not just societal pressures, but also the trust of 
customers, investment in innovation and other growth prospects.”94 Given the 
influence of social factors and the direct link to profit maximisation, shareholder 
primacy theory which asserts that social engagement should be ultra vires is con-
tradictory. Companies which incorporate CSR systems into their core objectives 
and reporting mechanisms ensure that the generation of profit remains the primary 
goal, yet do so in a socially responsible manner. Therefore whilst Berle and Dodd 
have traditionally been in conflict, in the modern setting it appears that companies 
must engage with Dodd’s theory of social welfare in order to truly achieve Berle’s 
concept of profit maximisation. CSR will be advantageous to a company’s bottom 
line and corporate reputation as the correlation between risk, financial volatility and 
CSR performance is increasingly relevant. Intangible benefits, for example good-
93 Michael Wenzel, The social side of sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as moderators of deter-
rence, 28 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 547, 549 (2004). 
94 Ian Davis, Business and Society: The Biggest Contract, THE ECONOMIST, May 26, 2005. 
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will, may now be considered to have a direct impact on a company’s bottom line; as 
a result, actions which increase goodwill such as pure social welfare may be intra 
vires. Therefore shareholder theory appears to be outdated and inflexible in light of 
changing stakeholder expectations.  
The failure of shareholder theory to acknowledge the benefits of social engagement 
demonstrates that the market may have moved beyond pure profit maximisation as 
the definitive role of the corporation, and instead embraced social engagement and 
CSR as a means to benefit both the community and increase shareholder wealth.  
 
 
